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The trial of Harry Croswell for seditious libel i s in 
Alexander Hamilton ' s own words, "in every view interest i ng. " 
For advocates of f reedom of the press, the case introduced a 
usable test for charges of criminal libel; for lega l 
historians, the case created a definitive doctrine for 
American jurisprudence; for students of Alexander Hamil t on, 
it is the l ast of a triad of precedent-setting cases i n 
Hamilton's legal career. l 
The Croswell case was actually born of a personally 
mot i vated feud between a Republican Party boss in New York 
s t ate and the junior editor of a Federalist paper. Ha d it 
not been for the participation of Hamilton, the Croswell 
case would not have caused a tremor beyond sta te borders. 
Hamilton ' s argument in the Croswell case suces sful l y 
challenged interpretation of a two-hundred-year-old law. He 
did not win a new trial, but he convinced New York 
legislators to change the law. The Sedition Act of 1798 wa s 
purported to ameliorate the common law of seditious libel, 
but its perversion in the courts by Federalist judges 
defeated that purpose. Hamilton's prescription for a 
balance between freedom of the press and the limits on that 
freedom satisfied both common sense and society, in that his 
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def i nition was quoted almost verbat i m i n twenty-three s t a t e 
const i tutions or stat utes. 2 
The participation of the pre ss i s a distinct i ve asp e ct 
of the political process of t he Uni ted St a t es. The 
influence of the press in the Ame r ican Revolu t ion and t he 
Revolution of 1800, when the Federa l i sts peacefully 
transferred power after twe l ve years o f uninterrupted ru l e , 
has been generally conceded. 3 Yet de f ining the 
respons i bilities of a high l y inf luential yet unaccountab l e 
component of the political process has troub l ed t houghtfu l 
ci t izens, not only of our own republic, but of ear l ier one s 
as we 11. •• Who wi 11 guard the guards?" has never been 
answered satisfactorily. What limits, i f any, they cou l d 
place on freedom of the press, and ho w to define those 
limits, was a matter of concern to members of the n ew 
c onstitutional government. 
It was recognized early in the Amer i c a n republi c t h a t a 
free pr e ss was a vital part of a just gove rnment, c al l i n g 
rulers to account to the governed. De fining t he pa r ame t er s 
of that accountability proved troubling, a s printed 
critiques of government in the early constituiona l era 
became unbearably harsh. The fury of press criticism 
provoked the government into a search for means to suppr e ss 
"licentiousness'· while preserving liberty. The mos t 
efficient tool, one that had been employed since 1605, was 
the charge of seditious libel. 
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Seditious libel was a distinctive form of libel, 
defined as p rinted matter that brought the government i nto 
"public hatred, contempt and r i dicule," thus cont r ibuting to 
"breach of the public peace." The concept of seditious 
libel has bee n regularly reconsidered throughout the 
twentieth century, often in response to events that raised 
the question of how much political dissent was permissib l e 
in time of national c r isis. The Sedition Act of World War I 
evoked a flurry of articles, which gave rise to the current 
scho l arship regarding freedom of the press, and its 
permissible limits. 4 
One of the earliest challenges to the assumption that 
the existence of the crime of seditious libel was compatib l e 
with f reedom of the press was Henry Schoenfield's essay 
"Freedom of the Press in the United States" originally 
published in 1914. Shoenfield challenged the conte mporary 
view that freedom of the press had always been a c her i she d 
tenet of the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the 
Constitution. He reminded his readers that freedom from 
prior restraint of publication, which served as censorshi p, 
was the freedom the Bill of Rights granted the press in the 
first amendment. s Schoenfield concurred with the view he 
quoted of Sir James Stephens, author of History of Crimina l 
Law in England, who based his discussion of sedition in two 
views of government. In one, the ruler is sovereign, and 
not subject to criticism by his subjects; in the other, the 
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government is servant to the sovereign people, and is 
accountable to them. Therefore, in such a government, 
there can be no such offense as sedition. 
There may be indeed be breaches o f t he peace 
which may destroy or endanger li fe , l imb or 
property, and there may be incitements to 
such offences, but no imaginable censure of 
the government, short of a censure which has 
an immediat e tendency to produce such a 
breach of the peace, ought to be regarded as 
cr iminal . 6 
This view was not a generally accepted one, as two semina l 
legal articles, a court decision, and a book suggest. 
Justice Holmes' enunciation of the l imits of 
permissible speech in Schenck v. United States ( 1919 ) 
spurred thought, and some discussion, in the legal press. 
W.R. Vance, in his article "Freedom of Speech and of the 
Press" explores the meaning of the First Amemdment and see ks 
the "scope and extent of the exising right of free 
publication ... at the time." He looks to the common l a w 
rules of 1789, and the later Sedition Act of 1798, and 
demonstrates that restrictions accompanied d ec lara t i ons o f 
support for liberty of the press in state constitutions , a s 
well as the federal constitution. "It is difficult to 
determine how to draw the line just a t the place" between 
liberty and licentiousness, but Vance draws that line 
between resistance to the law, or breach of the peace, and 
"all other utterances, however vextatious or harmful." 
Vance's view supports Holmes' dictum that liberty of the 





I • . 
this constitutional provision affords no protection for a cts 
which at common l a w were crimes." Vance reject s 
Schoenf i eld's radical position, and finds it perfectl y 
proper that the state may defend itself through prosecut i ons 
of seditious libel. However, he believes that judges who 
prosecuted seditious libel cases were carrying out exist i ng 
law, and Schoenfield believes that those same judges ignored 
the law, part icu larly provisions of the Sedition Act that 
protected the defendant. This oPPosing position of t wo 
legal scholars embodies the tension between law as it exists 
on the books, and law in actual practice. It is a 
dist inction that trips up many a historian. The law ' s 
existence in statute or common-law form is no guarantee that 
i t will be enforced as intended, or indeed enforced at all. 
As Vance himself concludes, law "supported by pub l ic 
sentiment" will be enforceable," wherea s one violating the 
public sense of just i ce and freedom" will result in 
acqui ttal . 7 
Thomas Carroll turns to consideration of the Sedition 
Act itself, and comes to the conclusion that the First 
Amendment was a Blackstonian prohibition, and was referring 
to prior restraint. Therefore, the Sedition Act was 
constitutional, an advance over the common law tenets that 
limited the jury and prohibited truth as a defense, and 
would actually have expanded freedom of the press. However, 
the attitude of the courts impaired the value of the 
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Sedition Act by employing it as a t ool to suppress pol i t i ca l 
opponents. 8 
Zechariah Cha ffee,jr., in Free Speech in the United 
States, is concerned with the immedi a t e b reach of the peace 
mentioned in Stephen, and seeks a test for cr i minality of an 
utterance. Chaffee is sanguine, however, r egarding the 
wisdom of the Supreme Court and rests h i s con fidence in 
Justice Holmes. "The principle thus enfo rced by the 
Const i tution is the interest of the community in the 
d iscovery and dissemination of t ruth. " 9 
There is, however, no test f or t r u th, and this is one 
of the sub themes of the great trilogy born of t he McCarthy 
era: Crisis in Freedom, Freedom ' s Fetters, a nd Legacy of 
Suppression. One man ' s truth is another man ' s treason, and 
John C. Miller demonstrated in Cr is i s i n Freedom that t he 
Federalist s viewed opposition as tre a son, and used t he 
Sedition Act to suppress dissent. Miller s ee s the Se d ition 
Act as a repudiation of French revolutionary ideas , and 
designed to protect Americans from the infe c tion of French 
democracy. However, Miller also states "i t was gener a l l y 
believed that in the United States the f reedom of the press 
was virtually unlimited" and comes to the conclusion that 
the Alien and Sedition Acts were the final nail in the 
Federalist coffin, because "their disregard o f the basic 
freedoms of Americans ... cost them the confidence and respect 
of the people. II JO 
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James Morton Smith confesses that he found "more and 
more modern parallels" but has "resisted any attempt to 
belabor them" in his detailed study of Sedition Act 
prosecution in Freedom's Fetters. Smith states that "The 
evidence is conclusive that the Sedition Law, as enforced, 
reduced the limits of speech and press in the United States 
to those set by the English common law in the days before 
the American Revolution." Smith further argues that the 
actual practice of the press in the United States went much 
further than the pre-revolutionary common law rule, and that 
resistance to the Sedition Act helped to shape "the American 
tradition of civil liberties."Il 
Leonard Levy subscribes to Smith's sentiment but 
disputes the theory in Legacy of Suppression. Levy argues 
that, contrary to the assumptions of Chaffee, Miller and 
Smith, the extension of liberty to the opposition press was 
non-existent in the early Republic, and that Sedition Act 
prosecutions forced an formulation of libertarian theory. 
In his later volume, Emergence of a Free Press, Levy 
conscientiously responds to criticism of Legacy of 
Suppression and revises his picture of press freedom in the 
early national period, acknowledging that practice far 
out.ran theory. It is the theory Levy is interested in, and 
he does not revise his earlier conclusion that the concept 
of seditious libel cannot exist in a democracy, and that a 
government cannot "be criminally assaulted by mere 
7 
words. ,, 12 
An essay critiquing Levy's work makes a point 
applicab l e to all three of the maste r fu l t omes ment ioned 
above. David Rabban accuses Levy o f i mposing twentieth 
century libertarian views on an ear lier era. "Levy f ails to 
recognize that it was possible for the framers of the firs t 
amendment ... to expand the protection f or freedom of 
expression well beyond the narrow boundaries of the Engl i s h 
common law while retaining some conception of sedi tious 
libel." Rabban's article, "The Ahistor i cal Hi storian," 
emphasizes that "Levy's refusal to re f lect on the paradoxes 
between practice and theory const i tutes a basic weakness of 
his analysis." Rabban argues that it is possible to discern 
a theory of freedom of expression that a ll ows critic i sm o f '. 
the government without total abol i tion o f seditious libel in i 
,,' 
the early years of the Republic. Rabba n holds that t h e 
Constitution and the First Amendment were the culmination of 
a tradition engaging both the Radical Wh i g inf luences in t h e 
American Revolution and democratic movements in the 1790s 
triggered by the French Revolution. He regards Levy ' s 
standard of total rejection of seditious libel as one of 
unwarranted rigor for libertarian theory and practi ce, both 
in England and the " colonies before the Revolution. 13 
There was a societal consensus for the concept of 
seditious libel, as the arguments against the Sedi t ion Act 
demonstrate. Despite their stirring econiums on freedom of 
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the press, the Republican opposition mere l y resisted 
jurisdiction of the disputed law. Republican opposition 
centered around federal, rather than state, prosecutions of 
seditious libel. A few radicals bruited the idea that 
pol i tical speech cannot be limited .after the expiration of 
the Sedition Act, but government officials did not consider 
i t seriously, as evidenced by continuing prosecut i ons in 
state courts under the Republican aegis. Rabban has a 
legitimate point--it is immaterial whether contemporary 
belief endorses the l i bertarian view; courts, legislatures, 
executives, and the newspapers themselves agreed that, at 
the t urn of the nineteenth century, there were limits to 
liberty, and a line needed to be drawn between liberty and 
licentiousness. 14 
The line t hat satisfied society was drawn in 180 4 in a 
New York case of seditious libel. People v. Croswe l l i s no t 
unknown to legal historians or historians of journalism. I t 
is a particular joy to legal scholars, for the many 
procedural and technical oddities that Croswell fe a ture s . 
Journalists cite it as a marker on the road to a untrammeled 
press. Every biographer of Alexander Hamilton mentions it 
as his last great contribution to American law. From a l l 
these perspectives, the question rarely arises, why Harry 
Croswell? How did Alexander Hamilton come to defend a truly 
minor prosecution of a truly minor paper? Croswell was not 
a cause celebre; its timing was very unfortunate. Newpapers 
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outside New York State took no note of the lengthy 
indictment process in J anuary 1803, when Harry Croswell was 
first bound over for tria l , and the arguments of his de f ense 
first advanced. The trial itself took place during t he 
excitement over the Louis i ana Purchase, and the Louisiana 
Purchase was a much bigger story. The Gazette of the Uni t e d 
States was the only paper outside New York to give 
Croswell's trial extended (if belated) coverage, and merely 
reprinted the account printed in Croswell ' s own paper. It 
is likely that Croswell knew someone at the Gazette, as they 
had also reprinted contributions from his deplorab l e Wasp. 
Croswell finally attracted attention when Al exander 
Hamilton undertook the appeal for a new trial, because h i s 
definition of seditious libel and freedom of the press were 
incorporated first into New York State l aw, then the state 
constitution, and copied by other sta t es , in t hei r laws and 
constitutions. Croswell achieved its fame in Hamilton's 
arguments, which have a surprisingly conte mpora ry ai r. '~ 
Harry Croswell became a symbol for fr eedom o f the press 
not because his cause was just, or his t enets a dmi r a ble, but 
because he lived in Hudson, New York. The poli t ical 
relationships that connected the partic i pants in the 
Croswell case are rarely regarded. A petty parochial feud 
was the impetus for the Croswell case, and only Hamilton's 
partiCipation catapulted Croswell into his t ory. 
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A SURVEY OF SEDITIOUS LIBEL 
The charge of seditious libel was created in a de cis i on 
of the St ar Chamber in 1605, and was described in De 
Libel l is Famosis in Sir Edward Coke ' s Reports in 1606. The 
concept of crimi nal defamation of a pub l ic off i cial had 
originated in the medieval statute Scandalum Magnatum, 
forbidding the spread of "false news" regarding the great 
men of the realm. The law was a response to the pol i tical 
unrest following the baronial wars of the 1260s, and its 
purpose was to encourage barons to press criminal charges 
rather than r esort to due l ling in a quarrel. Recompense for 
injured honor could be obtained in a civil suit for 
defamat i on--the criminal charge was to prevent violence . 
Yet true accusations of wrongdoing were not defamatory, so 
truth was a defense in this statute. l 
With the advent of the printing press, supress ion of 
criticism of the government became a major objective of the 
Court of Star Chamber, which was charged with t he 
preservation of order in the realm. Printers were requi red 
to obtain a license (i.e. authority from the crown), to 
publish, and were liable for defamation suits or 
prosecutions for seditious libel after publication. 
Phillip Hamburger, associate professor at the University of 
Connecticut Law School, emphasizes that use of the word 
"libel ll misleads many histori a ns. "Libe l " not on l y refers 
to a "technical, legal term fo r a written defamat i on ll but 
also defined any pamphlet or smal l book , despite its 
content. 2 The t erm "seditous l ibel " was u sed 
indiscriminately i n criminal prosecut ions. An unlicensed 
wr i ting, or even an anti-government pamphle t , i s not t he 
same as a wr i tten defamation o f a gover nment personage; thus 
not all tria l s for seditious libel in t he seventeenth 
cent ury were necessarily for the written de f amat i on we 
understand as seditious libe l . The concept o f seditious 
l i bel was devised to control the p r ess and provide t h e 
gove r nment with the means to defend i tself against poli ti cal 
dissent. 3 
There was little precedent in exist i ng common law to 
satisfy a government seeking to s uppress p ri n t ed d i s s ent. 
In 1606, Star Chamber, charged with t he preservation of 
order and peace in the realm, issued a decision i n a case of 
crimi nal libel which altered the appli cat i on o f Sca ndal um 
Magnatum and the essence of de f ama t ion. Co l in Rhys Love ll , 
professor of history at University of Southe rn Ca lifornia, 
clarifies further, "the personnel and the overr i ding v iew of 
the court made it view any criticism of the government a s a 
wrong to be punished ... no defense was possible for a 
political libel." Therefore, in 1606, the crime of 
seditious libel--"publications defamatory of existing public 
officers, of government, institutions or law"--was defined 
14 
by Edward Coke in his report of De Libellis Famosis. 4 
Lewis Pickeringe was convicted in the Star Chamber 
Court for a written rhyme lampooning the late Archbishop of 
Canterbury. 5 Coke himself best expressed the alteration to 
the law of l ibel. A written libel of a private person was 
now criminal. The harm of libel no longer lay in damage t o 
reputation; the harm was the inci t ement to revenge; 
and so tends to ... to quarrels and breach of 
the peace, and may be the cause of shedding 
of blood, and of great inconvenience: if it 
be against a magistrate, or other public 
person, it is a greater offence; for it 
concerns not only the breach of the peace, 
but also the scandal of Government; for what 
greater scandal of Government can there be 
than to have corrupt or wicked magistrates to 
be appointed and constituted by the King to 
govern his subjects under him? And greater 
imputation to the State cannot be, than to 
suffer such corrupt men to sit in the sacred 
seat of justice, or to have any meddling in 
or concerning the administration of 
justice. 6 
Coke further pronounced that the charge of libel could be 
made even if the subject was dead, because the tendency to 
breach the peace remained, and in the case of a dead publ ic 
official "the libeller traduces and slanders the State and 
Government, which dies not." Scandalum Magnatum did not 
offer the sufficient protection of all government officials 
that this new law did. In a departure from both existing 
statutory and corrunon law, truth of the libel was no defense; 
the crime lay in the tendency to break the peace, not in 
demonstrable falsehood. This comprehensive decision 
included pictures, signs and songs, and defined publication 
15 
) 
as passing the libe l t o any other party . Indict ments cou l d 
b e handed down by a gr a nd jury, or by i nformat ion 
(complaint) to t he attorney general. The p uni s hments 
included fines, imprisonment, and i n extre me cases, 
the pillory and loss of ears. The crime itse l f was a 
misdemeanor , but was t r eated as a t reason. 7 
In this decision, Star Chamber was creating a l a w t hat 
had no precedent, upon which the common law depended . This 
woul d generate problems when common law t ried to absorb the 
cr i me o f seditious libe l into t he exis t ing precedent s of 
defamation. It was a polite legal fict i on that judges 
"discovered" the common law in previous dec i s i ons, but in 
actuality, common law was judge-made law. As one of the 
judges of the Star Chamber, Coke had made t h is law, and its 
contradict i on of previous law of defamat i on wa s a never -
endi ng source of conflict. This pronouncement of Coke' s was 
specifically aimed at defamation of offici a ls; it wa s no t 
yet broadened to include libels of government , but only 
individuals in the government. The expansion o f th i s 
doctrine to include all criticism of government developed 
concurrently with the attempt to control the press 
throughout the seventeenth century. a 
In 1641, Parliament abolished Star Chamber. The 
defens ·e of truth in defamation migrated to the common law in 
civil suits only, for oral slander as well as written 
defamation. The doctrines laid down in De Libellis Famosis 
16 
were absorbed in criminal common law. 9 
Throughout the turbulent events of the civil war, 
Commonwealth, Protectorate, and Restoration, licensing of 
the press and supression of governmental criticism by 
prosecutions for seditious libel were pOints of agreement 
for all sides. Licensing of the press expired after the 
Glorious Revolution, but continuous trials for seditious 
libel refined the doctrines of De Libellis Famosis and 
limned the boundaries of press freedom. By the eighteenth 
century, the options of a printer accused of seditious libel 
were limited indeed. The costs of defense, even in an 
acquittal, which was rare, were enough to satisfactorily 
suppress criticism of the existing government. 1 0 
In a series of trials after the Restoration, the common 
law incorporated the elements of seditious libel. Mos t of 
these elements had been established in Star Chamber act ions, 
but trials before judge and jury did not alter them. The 
jury actually posed problems for seditious l i bel 
prosecutions, as they could not be trusted to acquiesce in 
the political objectives of the court. Therefore, as judges 
instructed juries in this new law, these common law judges 
found it necessary to define elements to support practices 
established by Star Chamber. Those elements included the 
determination of the defamatory nature of the libel, the 
publication, or intention to publish, to a third party, and 
the malice, or bad intent, of the libel. This last 
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sometimes is known as the "bad tendency, " i. e. the tendency 
of the libel to incite violence in the third party, or 
audience to whom it was published. A libel's bad tendency 
not only applied to the libelled party, but also to those 
who read it, thereby making the accused responsible for the 
actions of other parties. The inc l usion of printers and 
booksellers as parties to the libel, extension of seditious 
libel to the government in general and not just individua l 
public officials, and the inclusion of the audience for a 
libel, not just the libelled party, had all been established 
in Star Chamber, and trials between 1663 and 1688 confirmed 
them. In the earliest trial, in 1663, the jury asked for 
the statute of seditious libel, and the judge had to admit 
there was none, that it existed in common law. In 1670, the 
jury confirmed its right, in Rex v. Bushell, to return a 
verdict against the judge's instruction, which i ndi cated 
that the jury would remain a complication in attempts to 
convict for seditious libel. ll 
In Bear's Case (1696), writing a libel, not publishing 
it, was deemed sufficient for conviction, and the dictum 
that the government had the right to defend itself and keep 
society safe, first entered the precedents. The judge also 
claimed for himself the power to determine if the material 
was libellous. In 1706, in Regina v. Browne, the jury was 
permitted to decide the innuendo, which means that they 
could identify the subject of the libel, sometimes disguised 
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in irony or sati re. 1 2 
By this point, the law of libel of magistrates 
out lined in De Libel l is Famosis had sufficiently depart ed 
from its defamat i on ancestry to possess its own precedents. 
However, rejection of the concepts -that juries were only to 
determine the fact of publication, and that truth provided 
no defense, continued as avenues of resistance to the law. 
The jury's refusal to convict in the celebrated Zenger case 
in colonial New York in 1735, despite the fact that it could 
not be used as precedent, inspired increasing discussion of, 
and actual practice of, freedom in the press. 1 3 
As the press grew more obstreperous on both sides of 
the Atlantic, legal authorities cast about for more 
convincing arguments to enforce the law. The desirable 
ob j ectives behind the concept of seditious libel, to 
preserve the peace and reputation of government, were 
insufficient to answer the objections to its elements o f 
enforcement. 
As Leonard Levy has pointed out, writers, printers, and 
de f ense attorneys concentrated their struggle for freedom of 
the press on two points: the limits placed on the jury, 
which was only allowed to decide the fact of publication, 
and the denial of truth as a defense. During the middle of 
the eighteenth century, English courts established the 
principle of "the greater the truth, the greater the libel," 
reasoning that if the libel were true, incitement to 
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violence was that much greater. To t he ordinary Engl i shman 
who comprised juries, this concept was absurd. In a series 
of trials from 1770, juries refused to convict, or returned 
partial or incorrect verdicts. In Rex v. Dean of St. Asaph 
in 1784, the court was adamant that t h e province of t he jury 
was to decide on the facts alone-- t he fact of publication 
and the meaning of the innuendo, i.e. if the parties named 
in the indictment were the parties libel l ed. The court 
would rule on the law--intent of the libe l ler (malice ) and 
whether the material was libellous. As Zechariah Chaffee 
demonstrates in his discussion on seditious libel, there 
were really three issues in debate = "questions of law; 
ques t ions of fact; questions of the application of a legal 
standard to the facts." And he contin ues, " the definition 
of the crime of sedition was accepted for the time be ing by 
all concerned." The law was not in di s pu t e; juries rarely 
denied that the king referred to in a libel was the king, or 
the man identified as the author of a libel was himself. 
Those were facts. But the judge reserved application of a 
legal standard to the facts to himself alone, and juri es 
resented it. H 
There were no seditious libel convictions after 1745 in 
the American colonies (despite regular attempts), yet such 
liberality did not curb the tumult of political discussion 
which led to revolt thirty years later. In 1765, William 
Blackstone issued his Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
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A comprehensive discussion of conunon law precepts in four 
volumes, "the Conunentaries had a tremendous sale [in America 
and ] ... served as the principal means of the state of English 
law in general." It was by such means as Blackstone that 
the colonists demanded their rights as Englishmen, based on 
their natural rights in conunon law. 
However, this clamor for the application of 
English legal principles to the colonial 
situation was not based on a love for the 
technicalities, niceties and fictions of the 
common-law system, but rather on an appeal to 
the common law as an embodiment of natural 
law principles of individual rights and 
personal liberty. 
Having argued themselves out of the British empire, the 
former colonists took the common law with them. Most states 
passed a declaration stating that the laws in force at the 
time of the Revolution would remain law, including the 
common law. New York was among these. I S 
Among the many issues in common law was the probl em of 
seditious libel. There was little objection to the concept 
of a government defending itself against vituperative 
journalists, and American newspapers and broadsides were 
candid to the point of savagery. Blackstone's Commentaries 
offered cold comfort to a new country seeking to defend 
itself from a rowdy and untranunelled press. Blackstone 
defined freedom of the press only as freedom from licensing 
laws, and warned a licentious press that it would have to 
suffer the consequences of its criticsm. As licensing laws 
had been defunct for almost a century, no guidance would be 
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had from Blackstone. Blackstone a l so rec i ted the chapter 
and verse of sedi t ious libel; the essence o f the crime was 
not the defamation but the "bad tendency" (breach of the 
peace ) , truth was no defense and the j ury could only 
determine the fact of publication and confirm the innuendo. 
The new American states were left to cont r ol their presses 
as best they could. 1 6 
Unfortunately, the statute which was to answer these 
objections to seditious libel was not implemented as 
designed. The Sedit i on Act, the most liberal legislation 
regarding seditious libel in the eighteenth century, was 
instigated by the usual motives of a government suffering 
stinging rebuke. Federalists argued fo r i t s passage as a n 
emergency measure . War with France seemed i mminent ; 
cr i ticism of the government under such stress was 
unjustified, unpatriotic, bordering on tre ason . The 
principle enunciated in Bear's Case one hund r e d yea r s b e f o r e 
was brought forward in support; the government had a r i ght 
to self-preservation, and that include d the r i ght to defend 
itself against treasonous attacks. In the words of Marshal l 
Smelser, "The anti-Federalist press seemed to exist on l y to 
misinform, to scandalize and, ultimately, to overthrow the 
government." Therefore, a sedition law to suppress 
opposition papers seemed thoroughly justified. The 
Federalists ' Sedition Act carried two safeguards that had 
been denied since Coke's time; the jury would decide the law 
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as well as the fact, and truth would be considered in 
defense. 17 
Federalists were righteously indignant when the 
opposition furiously attacked the i r munificent measure. 
Republicans conceded the right of the government to se l f-
defense. They did not deny the concept of seditious libe l . 
But they bitterly opposed the capacity of the federa l 
government to legislate for the states. Criminal common law 
was the province of the states, and the federal government 
had no jurisdiction in state courts. Republicans vigorously 
denied that state presses came under Federal control. 1 8 
The Sedition Act passed. The Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, denying the power of the federal government to 
legislate for the states, were not taken up by the other 
states. But the political nature inherent in the cr i minal 
charge of seditious libel doomed any advancement of r e f orm 
the Sedition Act might represent. 
Enforcement followed the sorry, predictable path. 
Smelser remarks that "the administration of the law showed 
its purpose." According to James Morton Smith, there were 
fourteen indictments, eleven trials, and only one acquittal 
under the Sedition Act. None of the innovative provisions 
had prevented the classic political prosecution of the 
charge. "The clause on truth was nullified by t he courts; 
the right of the jury to decide the criminality of the 
writing was usurped by the pres i ding judges; and the test of 
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intent was r educed t o the seventeenth-century common law 
test of bad tendency. II Despite the advances in seditious 
libel law secured by the Sedition Act, t he enforcement of 
the act was so brazenly unfair as to provoke resistan ce and 
protest. Historians concur that the Sed ition Act 
contributed to the Federalist defeat i n the election of 
1800. 1 9 
In any case, the Act was designed t o e xpire in 1801, 
and prosecutions for seditious libel were left to the 
states . Because American law was in the process of test i n g 
which portions of the common law were applicable to the 
United States and which were not, there was considerable 
confusion over which provision s of seditiou s libel law wer e 
in force. The extreme partisanship of the nation's 
newspapers, and the political motivation behind a seditious 
libel charge obscured a shared aversion to t he t eno r of 
printed discourse. As the new century opene d unde r a n ew 
administration, government officials were avid to curb p r e ss 
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On the 11th day of January, 1803, Harry 
Croswell, the junior editor of the Balance 
was taken by an officer on a bench warrant 
and carried before the court of Sessions of 
Columbia County, then sitting in Claverack. 
Two indictments were then read to him ... 1 
As Harry Croswell was indicted for seditious libe l , 
men with close personal, professional, and political t i es 
surrounded him. All of the judges on the bench were 
Republican, and three who would eventually sit in judgment 
of his cause owed their positions to the prosecuting 
attorney. Croswell's defense team was a triumvi rat e o f 
leading young Federalists, personal as well as po litical 
friends, residing in nearby Hudson, where Croswell ha d 
published the items under indictment. z 
The prosecuting attorney was not, as might be expected, 
the district attorney for Columbia County. He was Ambrose 
Spencer, Attorney General for the State of New York, 
political powerhouse and crony of DeWitt Clinton, nephew of 
the sitting governor. In their notorious tenure on the 
Council of Appointment the year before, Clinton and Spencer 
had scandalized opponent and sympathizer alike by their 
wholesale distribution of political spoils. J 
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After the Republican electoral victory of 1800, the 
political arrangements of New York state, already complex, 
became even more complicated. The outlines of alliance that 
had prevailed since the ratification of the Constitution in 
1787 were radically shifted. Previously, Parton's famous 
quote summed up the main divisions: "The Clintons had 
power, the Livingstons had numbers, and the Schuylers had 
Hamilton. ,,4 The Clintons and the Livingstons had combined 
to rout the Hamilton adherents, who espoused the Federalist 
cause. George Clinton, multi-termed governor, had led the 
state throughout the Revolution and Confederation, 
spearheaded the fight against ratification of the 
Constitution, and had become the natural leader of the 
opposition to the Federalists in New York state. The 
Livingstons, a large, wealthy and politically prominent 
clan, had withdrawn their support of Federalists during t h e 
initial organization of the new government, when not one 
Livingston received a federal appointment. Growing 
displeasure with Federalist financial and foreign policy 
solidified their estrangement. 5 
Livingstons were divided among themselves; the "upper 
manor" Livingstons were wealthier, bitterly jealous of 
Schuyler influence, and not as politically active as, but 
equally hostile to, the "lower manor" Livingstons, their 
influential and more numerous cousins. The "upper manor" 
and "lower manor" Livingstons did not speak to each other, 
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yet sporadically would join in support for a Clintonian 
candidate over a Federalist one. Their alliance with 
Clinton was not a fervent one, nor was it monolithic, as the 
"upper manor" branches of the clan, founders of Columbia 
County, occasionally allied with the Federalists in order to 
curb Clintonian power and squelch their activist cousins. 
The more powerful "lower manor" Livingstons were more 
inclined to Republican positions, but "their chief interest 
in politics, as always, remained the Livingstons.,,6 
The disputed presidential election of 1800 rent the 
successful New York Republicans into three factions: the 
Clintonites, who had supported Jefferson over Burr; the 
omnipresent Livingstons, stashing cousins and in-laws into 
every available office as reward for their support; and the 
Burrites, retainers of the new vice president, who were 
squeezed out of positions of power by the other two 
factions. Burr bided his time and maintained his "Little 
Band" of faithful adherents and an extensive, if small, 
party organization. The defeated Federalists divided, and 
would wander from one faction to another, thereby 
influencing the balance of power and appointment at any 
given moment. But the Council of Appointment in 1801 was 
beholden to nobody, and its two dominant members were the 
governor's nephew, DeWitt Clinton, and his faithful crony, 
the apostate Federalist, Ambrose Spencer. ' 
By all accounts, that Council of Appointment was 
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ruthless in its sweep of state offices. Spencer and Clin t o n 
remov ed every Federalist, no matter the length of his tenure 
or the el i gibility of his successor. This was sti l l a new 
practice in American politics, where t he idea l of civ il 
service was to exempt some officeholder s from the 
consequences of elections. There was certainly some 
practice of rewarding partisans with appo i ntmen ts, but t h e 
blatant approach taken by Clinton and Spencer was considered 
outrageously cold-blooded, with no pretensions to merit. 8 
Therefore, when the indictments were read that January o f 
1803 in the Court of General Sessions, Harr y Croswell face d 
a panel of local judges, reputedly al l Repub l ican; a j ury o f 
"twelve notoriously violent party men, and a l l of that si de 
of politics opposed to the defendant " ; and his accuser was 
"he man known to hold the polit i cal power in the state. ,,9 
Of the three defense attorneys, Willi a m Van Ness had 
been dismissed as surrogate for Columbia County by Ambrose 
Spencer; Jacob R. van Renssaler was of a family long al l ied , 
politically and personally, with the Schuyler-Hamilton 
Federalists; and Elisha Williams, also a staunch Federalist, 
had a personal interest in defending the charge. The libel 
that had brought Harry Croswell to the Claverack court house 
was actually written by Williams' young brother-in-law, 
Thomas Grosvenor, who was reading law in Williams' office. 
A criminal conviction is not an auspicious beginning to a 







was a contribut i ng factor to Williams' participat ion. JO 
The case had originated in the summer of 1802, when the 
newspapers of the United States were zestfully disseminating 
the acid accusations of James T. Callender. Callender was 
the author of two scurrilous screeds, A History of the 
United States for the Year 1796, and The Prospect Before Us, 
political tract s that lambasted Federalist leaders and 
policies with a spleen unmatched in a journalistic era noted 
for its excesses. Callender had been tried and convicted in 
1800 under the Sedition Act in a trial renowned for its 
partisan unfairness. II When his patron, Thomas Jefferson r 
became the President of the United States, all editors 
convicted under the Sedition Act were pardoned and their 
fines returned, as the Sedition Act itself expired in 1801. 
For Callender this clemency was not enough, and when denied 
a political post by Jefferson, he turned on his fo rme r 
sponsor with the vindictiveness which made him notor i ous . 
In a series of letters printed in the Richmond Re g i ster , of :1 
which he was then editor, Callender revealed that, among 
other items, that Jefferson had read, approved, and 
financially supported The Prospect Before Us prior to 
publication. Federalist newspapers seized upon these 
wi 
disclosures wi t h delight; Republican newspapers reviewed 
these charges with chagrin; and newspapers throughout the 
country repeated, with appropriate remark, Callender's 
scandalous revelations.12 
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A primary expositor was, of cou rse, the New York 
Evening Post. As a lead i ng Federa l i st newspaper, it wou l d 
naturally follow Callender's expose wi t h breath less inter es t 
and scathi ng commentary. It was t he Post ' s series 
"Jefferson and Cal l ender /" running. in the summer of 1802, 
that the upstate tabloid the Wasp woul d se i ze upon, thus 
making its editor liable to ar r est . l 3 
It was a common practice, then as now, for newspapers 
to repeat features from other papers t hroughout the country , 
so it was quite natural for the Columbian Balance and 
Expository of Hudson/ New York to reprint some of the Pos t 's 
sensational series. However, the Balance took its ti t le 
seriously, and was unwilling to carry remonstrances t o the 
extreme deemed appropriate by its junior editor, Harry 
Cr oswell. Under the pseudonym of "Robert Rusticoat/ esq. " 
as editor, Cr oswell initiated publication of the Wasp , a 
small tabloid "in the Garret over the Bala n ce Of f i ce , whe re 
Communications, Advertisements and Subscriptions, wil l be 
thankfully received" in that summer of 1802. '4 
Croswell was anticipating the relocation of a 
Republican newspaper, the Bee, from New London, Connecti cut . 
Its editor, Charles Holt, was convicted of seditious libe l 
in 1800, and had finally wearied of upholding the Republ i c a n 
cause in a Federalist state, and considered Hudson a more 
receptive locale. Holt had reason to expect a cordial 






Spencer, presently Attorney General of the State of New 
York . 
Ambrose Spencer had reason to we l come a Republican 
organ in his own political base, as he was subject to far 
greater abuse than other Republican politicians. Until 
1797, Spencer pursued his budding political career under the 
Federalist aegis. Spencer had acquired experience as 
assistant attorney general under John Jay's first term a s 
governor, gained a place on the Council of Appointment, 
served both in the Assembly and the State Senate, and was 
viewed as a rising star in Federalist circles. Suddenly, 
during the debates in the New York Assembly over the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, Spencer had allied himself with the 
Republ i can opposi tion. I S 
Several reasons are posited for this change of 
allegiance. D. A. Alexander, a political historian of the 
early twentieth century, suggests that Spencer was moved by 
anger when denied the office of comptroller . Jabez Hammond, 
author of the earliest account of New York state politics, 
disputes this account and suggests that Spencer thought that 
Robert R. Livingston would win the 1798 gubernatorial race 
actually won by Jay; Peyton Miller, chronicler of Columbia 
County, does not mention the switching of sides but 
discreetly mentions the close friendship formed by Spencer 
and DeWitt Clinton in 1797. 16 Yet none of these 
explanations ever attempts to present Spencer's conversion 
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as prompted by any o t her cause than t hat of political 
advant age. Pol i t i cal historians of e very stri pe concede 
t hat Spencer's p rime political mot i vat ion was ambit i on. 17 
Hudson was the trading center of Columbia Count y, and a 
Federal ist islet in a Repub l ican s e a. I t was a young t own, 
established in 1784, becoming a port of entry by 1790 and 
had become "a location of consequence " by 1804. 1 8 It was 
not unnatural that, as a commercial center, Hudson would be 
predominantly Federalist in its poli t ical sympathies, and 
indeed, it was the home of what Progressive histor i an Dixon 
Ryan Fox t ermed "the Columbia Junto. ,, 19 This consisted of 
a trio of young lawyers with either forensic flair or famil y 
connections: Elisha Williams, Jacob Rutsen van Rensselaer 
and William W. Van Ness (not to be con f used with his cousin, 
William P. Van Ness, who was a c l ose assoc i ate of Aaron 
Burr ) . 20 It may be presumed that these p o li t ical a c t i v ists 
we r e amused by the Wasp's relentless st i ngs . It may al s o b e 
presumed "that they were startled when Harry Cro s we l l was 
indicted and arrested for seditious libel the following 
winter. 2 1 
It was not surprising that, despite their voc i ferou s 
outcry over the Sedition Act, the Republicans had instituted 
prosecutions in various states against Federalist paper s 
once the Republicans had achieved power. The Republicans 
had not disputed the concept of seditious libel, but had 
denied the federal government's authority to initiate 
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prosecutions. Opponents of the law insisted that 
prosecutions belonged in state courts. Despite the Sedition 
Act's merit as an improvement in seditious libel law, 
partisan Federalist judges had perverted and abused the law 
as a political t.ool in federal courts. The Act itself had 
lapsed in 1801, and prosecutions had proceeded properly 
(according to Republican views) in state courts, under 
varying state laws. The calumny heaped on Jefferson after 
Callender's sensational series would certainly merit a 
seditious libel prosecution, as there was still general 
acceptance of the principle of seditious libel. But it was 
most peculiar that the State of New York would indict the 
editor of a publication that was little more than a 
broadside, with limited circulation in an upstate town. The 
Wasp would not appear to have the exposure to bring the 
President of the United States into "great hatred, contempt 
and disgrace ... not only with the people of the State o f New 
York, and the said people of the United States, but also 
wi th the ci tizens and subj ects of other nations. ,, 2 2 If 
Spencer were prompted by party loyalty or a desire to defend 
the president, the Evening Post was a more obvious choice, 
as its comments and editorials were distributed throughout 
the country. The Wasp's little buzz could barely penetrate 
beyond Columbia County.13 
The criticism of Spencer in other New York papers, 
despite the level of invective customary at the time, was on 
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a more adult level, decrying his actions or his words. The 
Wasp was unmistakab ly a puerile production, using an ad 
hominem approach with labored ripostes of t he republica n 
press, ham-handed lampoons and inane doggerel. It is surel y 
unpleasant for any politician to face t he opposit i on p r e s s, 
but the venom of the Wasp was unendur ab l e. Perhaps t ha t is 
why Spencer attempted to disguise his purpose o f supp ressi ng 
the Wasp in a charge of seditious lib e l , rather than just 
suing for defamation (which he later did, when Harry 
Croswell refused to be subdued). A crimi na l c harge was far 
more likely to bankrupt a paper than a civil suit, as it 
involved jail sentences and bonds for s ubsequent good 
behavior, as well as fines. Spencer may have been 
attempting to divert attention from h i s personal an i mosity 
wi th a cloak of party loyalty. 2 4 
The artic l es indicted were from two different iss ues o f 
the Wasp; the first item was entitled "A Few Squa l l y Facts " 
and appeared on August 12, 1802: 
Mr. Jefferson wrote a letter to Mazzei, 
in which he plainly declared that he detested 
our constitution and that he and his friends 
would break its "Lilliputian ties." Mr. 
Jefferson was too weak in his nerves, openly 
to stem the popular current, set ting so 
strongly in favor of the constitution, he 
therefore insidiously, determined to gratify 
his hatred, by endeavoring covertly to 
undermine it---
For this purpose, 
1st. He employed Freneau and paid him, 
for writing the grossest lies and most 
scandalous calumnies against all its friends 
and supporters--







other, who would prostitute his pen, in an 
attempt to destroy the character and 
influence of Washington and his associates--
Witness his friendly invitation to Tom Paine, 
immediately after that infidel had written 
his villainous libel on our belove~ 
Washington--Witness his encourgaement and 
even writing in that sink of filth the 
Aurora--Witness him short hiS whole conduct 
and policy--
3rd. He paid out of his own pocket one 
hundred dollars to Callender, a drunken 
Scotchman, for writing "the Prospect before 
us"--A production than which, none more 
malignant, more false, more indecent and more 
truly hellish, ever issued from the head and 
heart, even of a professed jacobin. Nay! 
[more scandalous still] he wrote part of that 
very book--and perhaps that very part, in 
which Washington is called in effect a 
corrupted villain and a traitor. 
4th. He, from his own pocket, mostly 
defrayed the expences of publishing 
Callender's history of the United States for 
1796--a compleat counterpart of the Prospect 
before us--a thing similar to the suppressed 
history of Wood--and stuffed as full of 
falsehood and slander as to disgust even 
almost every faction in this country. 
By these acts, with a thousand others, 
equally vile and despicable Mr Jefferson 
became constitutionally* President; since 
which he has proceeded more openly in his 
attacks upon the Constitution. As 
1st. He ordered money to be paid out of 
the treasury to repair the Burceau, contrary 
to the clause in the constitution which gives 
the sole power of appropriating money to 
Congress. 
2nd. He has displaced the honest 
patriots of this country and . appointed to 
succeed them foreigners and flatterers, who 
have always shewn themselves hostile to it; 
one of whom+ was prime agent, in raising an 
insurrection to oppose the constituted 
authorities. 
3rd. He planned and directed the attack 
on the constitution last winter, by which the 
independence of the judiciary was destroyed 
and our constitution marred and mangled. 
4th. He has remitted a fine to a 
criminal++after the fine was collected; 
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against the express provision of the 
constitution. 
5th. He released Duane from a 
prosecution, inst i tuted for a l ibel on the 
Senate, without the least autho r i ty from the 
constitution, or any law--only , because Duane 
had contributed his share to lie him into 
office. It would be an endless t as k t o 
enumerate the many acts, in direct hostility 
t o common sense and the const i tut i on of wh i c h 
this "man of the people" has been gui l ty--
These are f acts, and I now ask his friends 
and foes--every American--do you not b l ush, 
for your country and your Pres i dent?--Do you 
not in all this plainly perce i ve the litt le 
arts--the very little arts, of a very little 
mind-- "Alas! what will the wor l d t hink of 
the fold if such is the shepherd. " 
* I say "constitutionally" for Mr. 
Jefferson had not a majority of the freemen 
in his favor.--It is capable of mathematical 
demonstration that, with out the assistance 
of the slaves in his own state and others to 
the southward, Jefferson could never have 
been President. 
+Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
++Callender. 
The other item, from the September 9, 1802 issue ran a s 
follows: 
Holt says, the burden of the fe deral song is, 
that Mr. Jefferson paid Callender f o r wr i t i ng 
against the late administration. This i s 
wholly false. The charge is explicitly 
this:--Jefferson paid Cal l ender for c a lling 
Washington a traitor, a robber, and a 
perjurer--For calling Adams, a hoary headed 
incendiary; and for most grossly slander ing 
the private characters of men, who, he well 
knew were virtuous. These charges, not a 
democratic edi tor has yet dared, or ever will 
dare to meet in open and manly discussion. 25 
The tactics employed by the defense team immediately 
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t, 
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" .. 
c; 
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revealed its strategy of delay . First, the defense 
requested copies of the lengthy indictments before entering 
a plea. This request, blocked by Spencer's objection, "with 
great warmth " was denied. Then the defense "suggested" 
that, due to the complexity and confusion surrounding 
current libel law, that the court refer the trial to the 
Oyer and Terminer Court, in order to obtain a justice from 
the Supreme Court to assist. Spencer objected--the court 
ruled in his favor. Then the defense asked for postponement 
to obtain witnesses to testify to the truth of the articles 
under indictment, and the battle was joined. Spencer 
rejected the idea that truth could be admitted in evidence, 
and insisted that Croswell be tried under common law, where 
the only question to be decided was whether the defendant 
had published the libels. To reinforce his argument, 
Spencer then stood on a procedural point--"an affidavit 
stating the grounds of application" was required in a motion 
for postponement--verbal argument was unacceptable. 2 6 
After an impassioned plea by the defense, "this could 
not be the law in our country" and urging that such an 
important question not be hastily decided, Spencer agreed to 
postpone one count for the Court of Oyer and Terminer, but ~: . 
·c 
insisted upon immediate trial for the other. "A majority of 
the court decided the trial not be postponed" and trial was 
set for the following day. 2 7 
At the end of the next day, the defense submitted the 
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required affidavit requestin g postpon ement, and s t ating the 
intention of the defense to p rove the truth of t he art i c l e 
in the issue of September 9th , 180 2 . Spencer agreed to 
postponement to the next Court of Sessions, and to send the 
lengthier indictment, of the artic l e entitled "A Few Squal ly 
Facts," to the Court of Oyer and Terminer. 2 8 
As the affidavit was not submitted unt i l evening , and 
Spencer dropped his opposition to pos t ponement at that 
point, we can on l y assume that negotiat i ons wer e going on 
during the day. What made Spencer change his mind? He had 
"the thing well cut and dried" accord i ng to the Centine l . 29 
The reasoning behind Spencer's reversa l can on ly be 
surmised. It appears that the referra l of the one 
indictment to the next Oyer and Terminer was t he equiva l ent 
of dropping that charge, because it was never tried. An d 
yet it incorporated the same l ibel Spencer was i nsist i ng on 
trying separately. Had he pursued the trial of "A Few 
Squally Facts" he could have included t he offens ive 
paragraph repeated in the September 9 i ssue. It would h ave 
been harder for the defense to argue the truth of all f ive 
items in that article, particularly that Jeffe rson had 
himself authored part of The Prospect before Us. Much o f 
the rest of the article was opinion, and the ser ious 
constitutional charges were simply no t provable, as the 
doctrine of judicial review was not ye t established . Nobody 
in the United States at that time was an accepted author i ty 
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to state definitivel y what was and what was not 
constitutional. So Spencer effectively dismissed t he more 
eas i ly convictable of the indictments a n d retained the more 
di f f i cult. Was a personal interest in that particular issue 
of the Wasp impairing his legal strategy? 
The bench, despite its initial support of his case, 
denied Spencer's request for a performance bond, apparent ly 
agreeing with the indignant defense that "it was a direct 
attack on the freed om of the press" and that, even under 
common law, prior restraint was no longer acceptable in 
Amer i can practice. The Balance noted that, despite the 
political complexion of the General Sessions Court, the 
judges' decision to deny a performance bond was "almost 
unanimous. " A lone holdout, Justice Hogeboom, supported 
Spencer. The court moved Harry Croswell's trial to the next 
Gener.:ll Sessions term. 3 0 
Of the many accounts of this case, few scholar s even 
wonder why an example was made, as John Miller puts it , o f 
an obscure editor in an upstate town. Jl Legal histori a n 
Julius Goebel offers an explanation not only plausibl e , but 
compelling . 
This may be accounted for by the fact that 
Columbia County was Spencer's political 
stronghold, and Hudson the locale of his 
early career ... this made him an irresistible 
target for Croswell's pen ... it may be 
surmised that this ... contributed to the 
relentless, if not rancorous, spirit which 
Spencer displayed in the case. It may also 
explain why an "obscure" upstate printer was 
singled out for prosecution rather than some 
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other and more influential Federalist 
editor. 32 
Some indication that Goebe l's surmise is correct may 
be discovered in the issues i n which t he indicted artic l es 
appeared. The list of charges in "A Few Squally Facts" are 
far more serious, both legally and i n t he i r imp l ica tions . 
IIA Few Squally Facts" were conceivab ly imp eachab le charg e s 
against Jefferson, if proven to be true, and should be 
harder for the defense to prove as t rue. The paragraph 
"Holt says" repeated one of the charges in itA Few Squally 
Facts" and was merely replying to a salvo of the Bee. Yet 
this was the libel Spencer chose to pursue. It may be tha t 
Spencer was more confident of conviction in a local court ; 
it is not unimaginable that he wished to bury the more 
politically explosive charge. If so, Sp e n cer was 
succe ssful, because the indictment for "A Few Squally Fac t s" 
disappeared into the Oyer and Terminer Cou r t a n d was never 
tried. 3 3 
There was an additional factor in Spencer's cho i c e t o 
pursue prosecution for the later issue of t he Wasp . Tha t 
issue also contained a juvenile but offens ive jingle c a lled 
"The Fellow Laborers." The Gazette of the United State s h a d 
picked up and reprinted it on the front page of the 
September 28, 1802 issue. So the Wasp's venom was actual l y 
ranging well beyond the borders of New York State, for the 
Gazette was circulated from Philadelphia. 
Th'Attorney-General chance'd, one day to meet 
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A Dirty ragged fellow in the street--
A noisy swagg'ring beast 
With rum, half drunk, at least; 
Th ' Attorney too, was drunk--but not with grog 
Power a nd pride had set his head agog. 
"The Fellow Laborers" continues in the same c r ude 
humor, but it incorporated a suggested remedy to the 
incensed Attorney General: 
" We've wrote the cursed fed'rals down, 
In sp i te of the i r sedition laws." J4 
Spencer coul d squash the Wasp and its vicious 
personal stings under the guise of defending the President 
of the United States. Harry Croswell stood trial for the 
seditious libel in the paragraph beginning "Holt says, " 
which issue also contained the obnoxious "Fellow Laborers. " 
The indictment for the potentially explosive "A Few Squa l ly 
Facts " was postponed, at Spencer's insistence, and was 
not heard a gain. 35 
Before the next General Sessions Court, the defen se 
team trumped Spencer and transferred the trial to the Oye r 
and Terminer Court by obtaining a writ of certiora r i from 
Supreme Court Justice James Kent, a steadfast Federalist, 36 
The trial of Harry Croswell for seditious libel fina l ly 
commenced before Chief Justice Morgan Lewis, on circui t , 
July 12, 1803. 37 
The trial itself was brief. The arguments over the 
necessity of postponement to obtain evidence for the 
defense, the admissibility of that evidence, the 








indictment, were all exp lored by an augmented defense 
before the jury was seat ed. Spencer was joined by t h e 
Co lumbia County district attorn ey, a man confusingly named 
Ebenezer Foot e. 3 8 
Abraham Van Vechten of Al bany and J a mes Scott Smi th o f 
Ne,,,, York joined the de f ense team for t h e t r i al. Wi 11 iams 
and Van Ness continued valiantly to ho ld up the Hudson 
connection. 3 9 Smith opened by requ est i ng postponement to 
obtain witnesses to the truth of the libel. Ant i cipating 
the prosecution's objection, Smi t h emphasized the necessar y 
difference between American and English common law. In 
English monarchy, the chief magistrate was t he sovereign, 
and "could do no wrong"; but in the American system, t h e 
p e ople were sovereign, and the ch i ef magistrate was 
accountable to them. To give the jury trut h in ev i dence was 
necessary, due to the difference i n the two const i tuti on s . 
Pos t ponement was necessary to obta in wi tnes ses who cou l d 
testify to the truth. 4 0 
Chief Justice Lewis responded that pos t poneme nt was 
dependent on the legality of this evidence. "He unders tood 
the l aw to be settled" that truth could not b e given to the 
jury as justification. 41 Elisha Williams then brought out 
a weakness in the prosecution's case. An offense against 
the federal government was being tried in a state court ; 
and, in a reference to the Attorney General "whose process, 
he must have well known, could not reach" the necessary 
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witnesses, implied that the state jurisdiction was 
insuf ficient for the charge. 1 2 
The d efens e then offered the argument that New York 
constitutional pronouncement on the common law rested in the 
constitution itself, whi ch declared that laws "REPUGNANT TO 
THIS CONST I TUTION be, and they hereby are, ABROGATED AND 
REJECTED" and among them were the old law of seditious 
libel, which did not admit truth as a defense. Expanding on 
the difference between the English and American 
constitutions, the defense emphasized the constitutional 
necessity of open discussion in the press, and argued that 
Engli sh common law was repugnant to the constitution of New 
York. "They contended, that the only line which could be 
drawn between the liberty and licentiouness of the press, 
was t he great line which separates truth from falsehood. 
This was the line marked by the law called the Sedition 
La w. ,, 43 
These brilliant arguments were to no avail. The Chi e f 
Justice r uled against giving truth in evidence, and 
professed himself "astonished at this application ... 1 
t herefore pronounce this to be the l aw--that the defenda n t , 
if he thinks proper, may bring up the question before the 
Supreme Court." Court was adjourned for the evening, with 
the trial itself to commence the next day.44 
The trial began the next morning without further ado. 
Testimony was taken that this libel had indeed been 
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pub l ished by Harry Croswell, and the persons mentioned were 
indeed understood to be Washington, Adams, and the Pres iden t 
of the United States Thomas Jefferson. Van Ness argued 
vigorously for the right of the j ury to decide the law as 
well as the fact; that there could be no malice when the 
item in question did not or i ginate wi th the Wasp; that the 
Wasp was merely correcting a pub l ication of the Bee. 
Spencer's closing argument included selected readings from 
the Wasp which included issues not under indictment, to 
demonstrate malice. The defense strenuously objected. 
Lewis then instructed the jury that they were to find only 
on the foregoing test i mony--they were to decide on the fac t , 
and he would decide the law. It was all very pro forma. 4~ 
Yet the case began to carom out of contro l at this 
point. The jury, twelve good Republi cans and true, took 
twelve hours to reach the simple and forgone verdict. The 
Ch ief Justice, too, seemed uneasy in hi s mind. For no 
sooner was the verdict of guilty hande d down, tha n the 
defense moved for an arrest of judgment unti l the Supreme 
Court could hear the case en banc (all justices prese nt) and 
Lewis promptly agreed. He conferred with the attorneys as 
to the best form the appeal should take, and remanded it to 
the next session of the Supreme Cour t of Judicature. 46 
Lewis may have been a reliable Republican, and had 
performed as was expected of him, but he had to have been 
aware that this case was laying precedents that might prove 
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untenable in future. Bringing it to the entire Court of 
Judicatu re was juridically prudent. It would also prove to 
be politically disastrous, for Croswell acquired two new 
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Pr i nc i ple, as we ll as pol i t i cal consider a t ions, 
influen c e d Alexander Hamilton ' s parti c i pation in Har ry 
Croswel l' s appeal. Despite his involvement in the 
prosection of two seditious libe l cases h imself ( one a s t ate 
prosecution in New Yor k against the Argus, and t he other i n 
Connecticut, agains t Cha rles Ho l t, o f the then Ne w Lon don , 
l ater the Hudson, NY Bee ) Hami l ton's posi tion was consi stent 
in all three cases. His biographer Forres t McDonald point s 
out that Hamilton wanted to use t ruth as a defense i n 
evidence, and was willing to l eave it t o a j ury to dec i de 
what was libel. l As t hose argumen t s ha d alre ady been 
rejected in Croswell's trial, in the appea l Ha mil ton would 
attempt an extraordinary maneuver--he would redefine the 
law. The Croswell case provided Hamil t on wi th an 
opportunity to secure a polit i c a l vict ory on the b a sis o f a 
a deeply held principle: 
I never did think the truth was a crime; I am 
glad the day is come in which it is to be 
decided; for my soul has ever abhorred the 
thought, that a free man dared not speak the 
truth; I have ever rejoiced when this 
question has been brought forward . 2 
Hamilton had followed Croswell ' s case, as had most 
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Feder alists in New York state; the Evening Post reprinted 
the Balance ' s account of the arraignment in January 1803, 
and the addition of two attorneys at t h e trial i t self in 
July was probably due to Hamilton-Schuyler influence. Al l 
that the Balance told of James Scott Smith was that he was 
from New York City; but Abraham Van Vechten was a political 
force in Albany, of the old Dutch stock and firml y 
Federalist. He and Phillip Schuyler were kindred spirits 
and political associates. It is likely that Schuyler urged 
Van Vechten's participation, and Smith may have r esponded to 
Schuyler's plea to h i s son-in-law. On June 23, two weeks 
before Croswell's trial, Schuyler wrote his daughter Eliza 
Hamilton: 
I have had about a dozen Federalists with me, 
intreating [sic] me to write your General. 
If possible to attend on the 7th of next 
month at Claverack as Counsel to the Federal 
printer there who is to be tried on an 
indictment for a libel against that 
Jefferson, who disgraces not only the place 
he fills but produces immorality by his 
pernicious example. To these applications I 
have answered that the Sittings at New York 
would extend to all the first week in July 
and that I believe it would not be possible 
for him to be at Claverack. I was however 
entreated to mention it to him. ) 
Hamilton obviously was occupied elsewhere; but he did 
write a lawyer in Philadelphia who had defended William 
Duane of the Aurora, asking for advice. The lawyer did not 
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reply until a month after the trial was over, so Hamilton 
did the next best thing. He sent a substitute. It is like l y 
he encouraged an available attorney i n New Yor k City t o 
a t tend the July trial. Thus J ames Scott Smith made his 
brief appearance in history, t hen r etreat ed to obscurity . 4 
At all events, Hamilton was prepared to undertake t he 
appeal for a new trial for Harry Croswe ll at the next 
session of Oyer and Terminer. 5 As it happened, the court 
moved the appeal to the February 1804 session in Albany. 
Hamilton brought with him Richard Harison of New York, and 
joined forces with the constant ' William Van Ness. 6 
The array of legal talent that gathered at Harry 
Croswell's appeal can be found in t h e rolls of losers and 
winners in the 1801 office stakes, orchestrated by Ambros e 
Spencer. Richard Harison lost the place of recorder of the 
Mayor's court in New York; Wi lli am W. Van Ness was di s missed 
as surrogate of Columbia County; William Coleman, who 
publicized the case for the Evening Post , had lost hi s job 
as court clerk in New York, and Hamilton and John Jay 
subsequently set Coleman up as editor of the Post. 7 
The winners were almost all on the bench, and were 
predominantly Livingston connections. Brockholst Livings t on 
ascended to the Supreme Court of Judicature, where his 
cousin by marriage, Morgan Lewis, had become Chief Justice. 
Morgan Lewis was brother-in-law of Chancellor Robert R. 
Livingston, head of the "lower manor" Livingstons. Smith 
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Thompson had studied law under James Kent, but the law firm 
broke up over political differences, and Thompson not only 
stayed with Gilbert Livingston, the erstwhile partn e r , bu t 
married his daughter as well. (Gilbert was brother of 
Robert R. Li vingston). Thompson served as liason between 
the Livingston contingent and Clintonian faction, 
and for his services in the election of George Clinton, 
received reward by a seat on the Supreme Court. Brockholst 
was the son of William Livingston of New Jersey, and 
therefore cousin to Robert R. and Gilbert. Brockho l st was 
also brother-in-law to John Jay. Hamilton had lived with 
the New Jersey Livingstons, when he arrived in the American 
colonies in 1774. Brockholst was a former Federalist, but 
had turned against Hamilton's financial policies when he 
lost a significant amount of money in 1795, and had broken 
with his brother-in-law over Jay's Treaty. The lone 
Federalist remaining on the bench, James Kent, had b een a n 
acquaintance of Hamilton's since 1787 a nd a friend and 
associate since 1795, and was an unabashed admire r. The 
court was short one justice, as the latest appointee 
declined to take his place on the bench. Instead, Ambr ose 
Spencer chose to continue as prosecuting attorney in the 
Croswell case, now up on appeal before these very judges. 
Three of them owed their appointments to him. Spencer saw 
no impropriety in pleading before his soon-to-be brethren. 
George Caines, shortly to be appointed the first court 
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reporter for the State of New York, assisted Spencer. 8 
The issue, as presented by the record of t he case, was 
"On an indictment for libel, c a n the defendant give t he 
truth in evidence? And are the j ury to dec i de both on the 
law and the f act?,, 9 The arguments in favor of the motion 
for a new trial were 1) that the trial should have been p ut 
o ff in order to obtain testimony supporting the truth o f t h e 
item under indictment; 2 ) that the piece read into evidence , 
from Number 7 of the Wasp, was "materially and substantiall y 
different" from the item in the indi ctment, and the p i ece in 
evidence was not libellous; 3) that the judge misdirected 
the jury, by instructing them that they were only to decide 
the fact of publication, and reserving decision on the 
intent and libellous content to the j udge, and rest i ng thi s 
direction on the pronouncement that the law stated in the 
case of Rex v. Dean of St. Asaph had b e en r ece ived in t o New 
Yor k common law. 10 
The arguments at the appea l fol lowed much the s ame 
lines as those of the arraignment and the trial. lI Va n 
Ness opened for the defense, maintaining that the judge 
(Morgan Lewis, sitting as Chief Justice in t h is hear i ng ) h ad 
erred in denying the admission of evidence to prove the 
truth of the alleged libel, and denying the jury the right 
to decide the law as well as the fact. Van Ness was 
referring to the jury's right to decide if the publicat i on 
was indeed libel, as well as the fact of its publication. 
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Van Ness brought forward multiple citations from the English 
common law in support of Scandululm Magnatum to demonstrate 
that falsehood was a necessary element for libel i n anc i ent 
English law, and that Coke himself had argued t r u th as a 
justification for libel before the issuance of De Libel li s 
Famosis. "Thus the common law, as previously established, 
was trampled underfoot by the most corrupt court that ever 
existed in England"--by the Star Chamber's ruling in De 
Libellis Famosis that truth was irrelevant in libel. Van 
Ness also claimed that Congress, "the supreme legislature" 
had, through the Sedition Act, made truth a justification--
that the Sedition Act was dec l aratory of the common law--and 
that "this is an authority pure and unadulterated; above 
all, it is American. n Il 
Van Ness demonstrated his vaunted skill with jur i es 
with this argument. It was logical, it seemed base d in 
ancient precedent, it appealed to the emotions. Ta in t ing 
the ancestry of the point he was contesting, by stressing 
its origin in the Star Chamber, symbol of monarchial tyranny 
was not only clever, it happened to be true. But declar i ng 
the Sedition Act declaratory of common law by present i ng 
Congress as the supreme legislature, capable of dictating 
state law, was touching on a hotly contested divergencve 
between Federalist and Republican viewpoints. Van Ness 
therefore made a stirring appeal to patriotism--the 
suggestion he made as to Congress' authority was above all, 
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American author i ty, not the tyra nnica l English Star Chambe r. 
Unfortunately, Van Ness was not speak i ng t o a jury, but a 
panel of judges of predominantly Repub l ican sentiment, whi c h 
had not only deplored the Sedition Ac t , but had done so on 
the grounds that Congress could not l egislate fo r the 
states. It is possible that Van Ness was making this 
argument not to t he judges, but to the spectators. The New 
York legislature was not only in session, but was apparen t l y 
in the courtroom, as two bills to rev ise the libel law and 
admit truth in evidence had been presented on Feb ruary 4. 
The Hudson Bee reported that IIduring t he argument, the 
chambers of the Senate and assembly were a l most abandoned 
and the forum was crowded with an audience that could 
appreciate the importance of the arguments and talents of 
the orators. ,, 13 
Van Ness then turned to citations tha t would suppo r t 
the rights of the jury "to show the gener al sense of t h i s 
country in favor of the common law rig h t of the jury to 
judge of the criminal intent, and of the law as well a s the 
fact. ,, 14 He was referring to the right of the jury to 
decide whether the material was libellous, and whether the 
intent was to wantonly defame, making the libel criminal. 
Yet the most important part of his sentence was the phra se, 
"the general sense of this country." Almost unconsciously, 
Van Ness was touching on the momentous issue facing all 
American courts in this period. How much English conunon law 
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was to be received into American law, and how to determine 
the boundaries, was an overwhelming task. Gi ven the nature 
of common law, judge-made rules on previous precedents, a nd 
the assumptions underlying common l aw, that it was based on 
self-evident reason, a concept equivalent to common sense, 
the emphasis on "the general sense of this country" recalled 
Van Ness ' s earlier wild appeal during Croswell's arraignment 
in January of lB03--"This cannot be the law in our 
country. ,, 1 5 In his insistence that truth had former l y been 
a justification for defamation, of which libel was a wri t ten 
form, Van Ness was on solid precedental ground. In 
rejecting that truth was immaterial in a defense for 
seditious libel, Van Ness was making an appeal to the 
legislators and judges who made the law, not to enshr i ne a 
law repugnant to common sense, or self-evident reason. To 
claim injury because the truth was written was repugna n t to 
the American polity, which had justified itself on se l f -
evident truths. 
Van Ness also urged the necessity of a jury to avo i d 
political persecutions, making acid allusions to the motives 
of the prosecution and on the provenance of the judges. 
This appears a little reckless, unless Van Ness was put t ing 
little hope in a victory in the courtroom, and was seeki ng 
to make his points to the men who could change the law, even 
in the face of an unsatisfactory ruling from the judges. He 
himself had entered a bill in the current session of the 
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legislature to modify the libel law, and wished to remind 
his audience of the relent l essness of the Attorn ey-General 
and his appointees on the bench in political matters. 1 6 
Van Ness also made the point that the court should not 
have allowed Spencer to read issues of the Wasp to t he jury 
when they were not admitted in evidence, as "the charge and 
the evidence varied substantially." The libels enunciated 
in the indictment left out the crucia l words, "Holt says. " 
Therefore the indictment listed the aspersions cast by James 
Callender, as if Harry Croswell had merely repeated them in 
the Wasp. The paragraph as actually printed in the Wasp was 
arguably not libellous. After some rhetorical flourishes, 
Van Ness retired in favor of George Caines. 11 
Caines appeared unnerved by the company and the 
arguments. He first acknowledged that he had prepared 
replies to arguments that had not been ma d e , and the n 
proceeded to offer those rebuttals. He then expressed hi s 
regret at his position in oPPositon t o Hamil t on, and made 
excessively graceful remarks as to Hamilton ' s virtue, and 
his admiration thereof . Caines then revisited the fami liar 
ground of seditious libel tenets; that a publication shou ld 
be judged, not by its truth, but by its tendency to breach 
the peace, and that it had been received common law "for 
ages." At one point Caines actually stated, "1 really fee l 
at a loss to argue in support of what is so manifest, and 
pervading every page of our books," yet he went on to do so 
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for sixt een more carefully documented pages. I 8 
Spencer rose to "argue this cause on authority; not on 
speculative t heories of what ought, or not ought to be, t he 
law. On these points, the two Houses now sitting, both 
above I and below us, are t he only persons to dictate. ,, 19 
Spencer averred that the defense had not manifested due 
diligence in procuring the desired witness from January to 
July, nor did the defense demonstrate that the witness would 
appear at the desired [later] date; and that the testimony 
f rom the witness was inadmissible anyway. Spencer then 
reiterated Lord Mansfield's pronouncements in the Dean of 
St. Asaph case, which supported "opinions adopted and 
acquiesced in for more than a century" and further quoted 
Mansfield on the dangers of letting a jury decide the law 
when "they have no rule to go by, but their passions and 
wishes." 2 0 
Spencer then attempted to defend his choice of libe l 
and printer. Croswell was indicted, not because he 
responded to a charge of Holt's, but because he repea t ed it 
--"every new publisher makes the crime his own." Then 
Spencer tried to justify his choice of Croswell in 
particular "a man who starts the enemy of our whole 
republican administration, professedly as he states it, to 
'whip the rascals naked through the land ' " (quoting the 
slogan of t .he Wasp). Besides, Croswell was attacking "the 
head of the nation." Spencer then launched into an 
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i mpassioned tirade on the limits of liberty and its 
infringements on the happiness of others. He denied t hat 
any court o f law would entertain an argument "founded on the 
idea of ... a Judge ' s attempting to deny justice." He had 
read additional issues of the Wasp "merely ... to satisfy the 
Jury. I have not attempted to embellish or adorn what I 
have had to advance. The points raised must stand or f all 
according to the law." It is an unconvincing and peculiar 
argument. Spencer did not need to satisfy the jury as to 
t he malice expressed in the Wasp; they were not permitted, 
in Spencer's argument, to determine intent anyway. In the 
position Spencer took throughout the case, the jury was 
merely to pronounce on the fact of publication; did Harry 
Croswell publish the disputed piece? For Spencer to read 
additional, unindicted items leaves himself open to charges 
of malice. By his feeble response, Spencer left to 
specu lation why he really took particular umbrage at Harry 
Croswell's puerile paper. It suggests that this was truly a 
personal animosity that singled out Croswell and the 
miniscule Wasp, rather than the Evening Post, or even the 
Balance, which was no friend to Ambrose Spencer. The 
stongest position Spencer took was that the defense was not 
arguing the law as it stood. Yet under the vagaries of 
common law, the law meant what judges (and juries) said it 
meant. Ambrose Spencer was finding, to his cost, that all 
the political power in the world did not always lend itself 
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to manipulation o f the l a w, and t hat a b latan t exercise of 
political power in t h e courtroom could o f ten ba ckfire. The 
Fe d e ralists c omp rising the defen se team ha d al ready been 
instructed in this pa i nful l esson. 21 
Richard Harison repeated the defens e ' s contention tha t 
fals e hood was a necessary component t o l ibe l in anc i ent 
common law, and emphasized the unsavou r y or i g i n of the 
prosecution ' s argument. To enforc e the provisions of 
sedit ious libe l "recourse was had to the Star Chamber, an d 
not to the common law. It was from that t i me, from t hat 
ominous e ra that we are to date the mod ern decisions, that 
t r uth is not material in quest i ons of libel. " Harison wa s 
unequivocal about the necessary course of act i on for 
American courts; "when decis i ons are s e en t o be repugnant 
to t h e common law, they ought to be t r eated as usurpat i on s 
of power and thrown as i de." 
Harison responded scornfully to Spen c e r 's expl a nation 
for reading additional issues of the Wasp. Hi s po i nt was 
difficult to refute--"if the intent was not to be taken in to 
consideration, the restraint ought to ha v e been on the 
prosecution as much as the defendant ... i n every view i t 
must have been improper .. . allowing evidence to convict, when 
the same evidence to acquit, was denied. " This scathing 
pronouncment delineated for the spectators, if not for the 
judges, the determination on Spencer ' s part t o discredit 
Harry Croswell. 2 2 
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Up to t his point, the attorneys for the prosecution and 
defense were a rguing different interpretations of common 
law, and how much of that cornmon law was received into 
American law at the time of the Revolution. As judicial 
precedent is the basis of common law, the question of a 
polluted stream of precedents was an important one. But 
that common law provided all nece.ssary definitions of the 
issues raised in t he Croswell case appears as an accepted 
principle by both prosecution and defense. As Alexander 
Hami lton rose to speak, the complexion of the debate 
changed, because Hamilton offered his own definitions, not 
only of the issues, but of the common law itself. 
Hamilton opened by acknowledging the importance of the 
issues and arguments before the court to the head of the 
na t ion, the components of the government, the authority of 
the law, and the rights of the citizens. He then commenced , 
as any good lawyer would, by defining his terms. "The 
Liberty of the Press consists, in my idea, in publishi ng the 
truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though i t 
reflect on government, on magistrates, or individuals." 
This simple statement, repeated throughout his lengthy 
argument, must have echoed hypnotically in the ears of his 
legislative audience. It was the core of the revised law of 
libel, finally passed and approved fifteen months later. 
The New York state constitution, revised in 1821, 
incorporated the same concise sentence. Eventually twenty -
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three states adopted t his construct in s tatutes and 
const i tut i ons. 2 3 
Hami lton was not content to l e ave his def i ni t ion 
ringin g through the courtroom. He p r oce e ded to 
dissect it phrase by phrase. To cri t icize measures wh i l e 
indemnifying the unfit men who made or execu ted t hem wou ld 
so l idify t heir power; freedom of the p r e ss t o pub li sh trut h 
regarding magistrates and individuals, a s we ll as 
government, is a check on that power. J ustif i ab l e ends, 
then, call those in power to account. It i s " t h e o f fice o f 
a free press ... to give us early alarm and put us on our 
guard against the encroachments of power. " Yet Hami l ton 
would not have "unbridled licence " ; good mot ives he 
considered essential, because tru th is not a j ust i fication 
for libel i n all cases: 
Personal defects can be made pub l i c only to 
make a man disliked. Here the n it will not 
be excused ... if he uses the weapon o f truth 
wantonly; if for the purpose of distu rb i ng 
the peace of families; if for relat i ng that 
which does not appertain to official conduct , 
so far we say the doctrine of our opp onents 
is correct ... that libellers may be punished 
though the matter contained in the libel b e 
true, in these I agree. 24 
Hamilton did not deny that "libelling shall continue to 
be a crime" and offered "with all diffidence" his own 
addition to the classic definition--"1 would call it a 
slanderous or ridiculous writing picture or sign, with a 
malicious or mischievous design or intent, towards 
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government, magistrates or individuals ... [butJ if it have 
good intent , then it ought not to be a libel"2s Emphasis 
on the slander and malice in this definition of libel evokes 
the elemen ts of defamation, from which seditious libel had 
been parted in De Libellis Famosis. To wed defamation to 
seditious libel would necessitate admitting truth as a 
justi f ication, as truth was a mitigating factor, and 
allowable in defense of defamation in common law. To use 
intent to mitigate the malice brought Hamilton and his 
audien ce to the essential question of who was to decide 
i ntent--judge or jury? 
Hamilton gently reminded his hearers that, despite the 
best intention of judges, the temptation to side with the 
administration of which they were a part was overwhel ming. 
"Ask any man, however ignorant of principles of government, 
who const i tute the judicial? he will tell you the favorit e s 
of those at the head of affairs." It was lost on no one 
present that he was addressing a bench of precisely that 
descripton, and therefore a jury, chosen by lot, balanced 
such a bench. When he asserted that the jury must decide 
intent, he described a safeguard against political 
oppression. Desseminating a defendant's chances among 
twelve judges, rather than one, obviously improved them. 2 6 
Hamilton then pointed out that the "tendency to 
provoke," the "bad tendency" of the prosecution's case, was 
an essential component of the malice inherent in libel, and 
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tha t even Coke concurred that malice and intent must be 
shown, and Hamilton emphasized that "the breach of the peace 
is not made the sale, but only one of t h e qua l ities. The 
quest i on is not on the breaking of the peace , but depend s on 
time, manner, and circumstances, which must ever be 
questions of fact for jury de t erminati on. ,, 27 
For the jury to exclude truth as i mmaterial, however, 
Hamilton maintained was unacceptable. "No tribunal, no 
codes, no systems can repeal or impair the l aw of God, fo r 
by his eternal l aws it [truth] is inherent i n the natu re o f 
things.1t The conflicting precedents cited by both 
prosecution and defense indicated that the law was not 
settled, and that "truth may be given in evidence". It i s 
"contrary to the common law; to the p r inciples of justice, 
and o f truth " to deny juries all mater i al facts, and among 
thos e is the truth of the disputed libel. It is against 
reason, and Hamilton defined common l aw as "Natural law a n d 
natural reason applied to the purposes o f Society. ,, 28 
Having rephrased the questions at issue, offe red a n 
original definition of liberty of the press, and refined t he 
definition of libel, Hamilton returned to first principles 
in his discussion of common law. Henry of Bracton, earliest 
of the cited authorities, defined natural law as God's law, 
written on the human heart and taught to all living things. 
Long usage and consensus comprised the common law, according 
to Bracton, and Hamilton recalled to his hearers, in this 
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refe rence, the heritage they all shared. Natural law and 
natural reason required the consideration of truth, in the 
jury's determination of intent, which indicates whether a 
libel exists. Libert y for the press demands that trut h, 
wi t h impunity, for good motives and justifiable ends, be 
allowed to guard against the encroachments of power. 29 
Hamilton concluded his plea with the admonition t hat 
" it is only by the abuse of the forms of justice that we can 
be enslaved . . . it is to be subverted only by a pretence of 
adhering to al l the forms of law, and yet by breaking down 
the substance of our 1 iberties. ,,30 In explaining what he 
meant by liberty of the press, and redefining the first 
princ i ples of common law in association with that 
explanation, Hamilton subtly shifted the grounds of debate, 
and returned the tenets of common law to a more flexible, 
and acceptab l e, interpretation, by wedding common law to 
common sense. He then characterized i t not only as t h e 
authentic, but the American common law. 
Hamilton placed before the court the questions: 
whether truth shall be given in evidence, and whether the 
Court (the judge) has exclusive right to decide the int ent 
(i.e., was the publication intended as libel). By 
rephrasing the issues, Hamilton was avoiding the idea that 
the jury decides the law, and emphasizing that intent makes 
the l i bel, as intent makes the crime. Thus, he def t ly 
deflected any unease that a jury could rewrite or distort 
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the l aw through ignorance, and overcame t he objection that 
laymen have no business decid i ng points of law. It was t h e 
i ntent t he jury had the right to c on sider, because inte n t 
was the necessary ingredient to t he c r i minali ty o f an act. 
Hamil t on explained that "the criminality of the act is a 
matter of fact and law combined" and t h e n he quoted Lor d 
Mansfield supporting this statement i n t he v ery opinion 
(Dean of St. Asaph ) whose author i ty was disput ed throughou t 
the Croswell affair! Hamilton further demonstrated that 
Mansfield had contradicted himself in that same opinion, and 
regretfully remarked, "we see the hardship into which the 
best of men a r e driven, when compel l ed to support a 
paradox. ,, 3 1 
Hamilton's original contribution, however , lay in his 
characterization of libert y of the press: t o pub l ish with 
i mpunity, truth, bu t only with good mot i v e s a nd for 
justifiable ends. It gained quick and widespread ac ceptance 
because it satisf ied a perceived need for a proper b a l an ce 
between liberty and licentiousness in t he press. Hamil ton 
was not pressing for an absolute right; under his doctrine , 
truth was not admissible under every circumstan ce. If t here 
be "design to injure another," or straying beyond the bound s 
of the public domain, truth was no shield to Hami l ton. 
Personal attacks and private vices were not the public's 
concern. In this he concurred, surp risingly, with element s 
of the prosecution's argument. Spencer, in an impulse from 
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his Federalist past, had urged that "Liberty consist s not i n 
doing what we like, but in doing at our will and pleasure 
those things on ly, which infringe not on the happiness or 
properties of others." Hamilton's limits on liberty wou l d 
blend well with such a distinction .. Caines, in a 
surprisin gly sophisticated proposition, contended that " the 
private virt ues of a public officer, are to the people of no 
kind of importance." He went on to say that public duties 
of an official were so clear and confined that "his mora l 
qualities can be detrimental only to himself" and equated 
moral scrutiny with a religious test, strictly forbidden by 
the state constitution. "Why should we require a test in 
morals, when we admit of none in religion?" A public 
of f icia l , concluded Caines, is not subject to a printer's 
moral standard. 32 
They had all had enough. Public men had been through 
t wo revolutions--one of separation from Great Britain, and 
the other a peaceful transfer of power after a bitte r l y 
contested election. The press had partic i pated prominent ly 
in each. Now it became apparent in a courtroom in Albany, 
after two-and-a-half days of argument, that both sides of 
the political divide were ready to agree on limits for 
public discourse. 
But not yet. In April, 1804 the Supreme Court en banc 
denied the appeal for a new trial. Morgan Lewis was not 
prepared to reverse himself; indeed, in his opinion, he 
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d e c l ared that "truth may be as dangerous as falsehood" and 
was unmoved by innov at i ve arguments; James Kent, still 
overcome with admiration for Hami l ton ' s performance thi r t y 
years later, wrote an op i nion i n f a vo r o f the defen se. Had 
the judges gone strictly on party lines, Smith Thompson 
would not have sided wi t h Kent; but h e did. According to 
Kent, Brockholst Livingston concurred with the argument fo r 
t h e rights of the jury, and told Kent h e would vote for a 
new trial. Yet when the day came to hand down the decision, 
Livingston sent word to his cousin b y mar r iage that he wou ld 
vote with Lewis, but would not attend court, pleading 
illness. Kent always believed Brockholst' s ind i sposition 
was a reluctance to face him. 3 3 
Because the judges were even ly div ided, t h e convict i on 
stood. Ambrose Spencer did not attempt to vo t e as justi ce 
while prosecut i ng as attorney genera l. An arrest o f 
judgment was granted, because the r e v i sed law o f libe l h ad 
incorporated Hamilton's proviso that truth was not 
justification in itself, but was published "for good mot i ves 
and for justifiable ends." The law had made its pa inful wa y 
through the New York Assembly, and was await i ng approva l 
from the Council of Revision, which consisted o f the Supreme 
Court Justices, the Chancellor and the Governor. 3 • The 
Council of Revision modified the law further, sent it bac k 
to the legislature in November 1804 for further polishing , 
and it became law in April of 1805. Harry Croswell never 
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served time or paid a fine; he continued to publish the 
Balance, with impunity. Spencer and Foote instituted a 
civil suit against Croswell for defamation. Spencer was 
awarded one hund.red and twenty dollars in damages. Ebenezer 
Foote was awarded six cents. Ambrose Spencer ascended the 
Supreme Court bench, and had an honorable career as judge, 
and satisfying career as party boss. Morgan Lewis became 
governor of New York that same spring. Brockholst Livingston 
became a Supreme Court justice for the United States. The 
Columbia junto--Elisha Williams, Jacob R. van Rennselaer and 
William W. Van Ness--remained the core of Federalism in 
Columbia county, and Van Ness eventually joined Spencer on 
the New York Supreme Court. Alexander Hamilton was murdered 
six months after the appeal by the vice president of the 
Unt ted States. J5 
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The development of freedom of expression as an 
unlimited right over the course of the twentieth century 
obscures a clear view of the Croswell case, two hundred 
years later. For us to understand how Croswell advanced 
freedom of the press in 1804, it is necessary to move away 
from Leonard Levy's statement that lithe concept of seditious 
libel and freedom of the press are incompatible." Seditious 
libel, the idea that "the government may be criminally 
assaulted by mere words" cohabited comfortably two hundred 
years ago with an idea of freedom of the press that was more 
l i mited than ours. l Indeed, the idea of absolute rights 
was not acceptable to the lawgivers and the lawmakers of the 
early nineteenth century. Ambrose Spencer was enunciating a 
fundamental principle of the republic when he asserted that 
"liberty consists not in doing what we like, but in doing at 
our will and pleasure those things only, which infringe not 
on the happiness or properties of others." Hamilton 
concurred in this description of limited rights when he 
conceded that the liberty of the press was subject to the 
restraints of the courts. 2 To impose a contemporary 
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concept of freedom o f the press upon a soc iety two hundred 
years past indicates t hat Levy is fa ll ing into the s ame tra p 
he perceived in prev ious twentie t h c entury s chol a rship. He 
is also grudging in h is concession that " the actual freedom 
of the press had s l ight relationshi p to the legal concept ion 
of freedom of the press as a cluste r of cons t raints. In 
short, the law threatened repression, but the pre ss 
conducted itself as if the law scarce l y e x isted. ,, 3 
Throughout his work, Levy is puzzled b y the tact i cs employed 
by attorneys and critics in combat t ing charges of sedi t ious 
libel: the attacks on the inadmissibility of truth as a 
defense and the limi t s on juries. Le vy is troubled that 
"they failed to repudiate the concept of sed itious libel . ,, 4 
Levy does not consider that t here might have existed a 
societa l consensus accepting the concep t of seditious libe l : 
that unrestrained liberty of the press wa s una cc ep tab l e to 
the society of that time. The idea that "mere words c ould 
criminally assault the government" might have held more 
meaning to a polity that had itself assaulted i ts gov ernment 
with mere words, and fostered a revolution. 
In 1800, mere words had brought down a government o f 
twelve years' standing. The Federalist Party had been 
turned out of office with mere words, and High Federa lists 
certainly believed anarchy and revolution would follow. 
That a rampant freedom in practice could co-exist with 
strictures in law Levy himself remarks on, with the further 
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observation that numer i cally few prosecutions do not make 
clear the scope, meaning, or law of pre ss freedom. s 
The confus i on in the theory of the law versus the 
practice of the press is traceable to the awkward or i gins 
of seditious libel. The concept of a defamation breaching 
the peace was centuries old, but a trial for defamat i on 
included the defense of truth and judgment by jury. 
Sedition is a political crime, defamation a personal one, 
and by combining them in seditious libel, Sir Edward Coke 
muddied the course the law would take for the nex t t wo 
centuries. As declaimed in De Libellis Famosis, the object 
of the law of seditious l ibel was to preserve the peace, 
thereby associating it with defamation, a misdemeanor with 
the same object. However, by labell i ng the new crime 
seditious libel, Coke combined a capital political crime 
with a personal defamatory misdemeanor. Coke did not 
attempt to make his new crime one eligib l e for capital 
punishment, possibly recognizing that "mere words" could sow 
disaffection, but were not an overt act of treason. Yet 
Coke was careful not to let juries pronounce upon the 
content of a seditious libel, but only decide on the 
evidence of publication. As breach of the peace was the 
ostensible object of this charge, the truth of the libel was 
immaterial; indeed, the legal aphorism, "the greater the 
truth, the greater the libel" proceeds from the notion that 
truth would provoke a greater breach of the peace. The real 
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object of the law was obvious from the beg i nning; schola r 
af t er scholar has demonstrated that the charge of s edi tious 
libe l served to suppress d i ssent . I t wa s singular l y 
unsuccessful. Within ninet y years o f its appearance in t he 
Star Chamber, three successive governmen ts in England were 
overthrown. 6 
After the abolition of the Star Chamber, absorption o f 
the charge of seditious libel into common law p r ocedu r e s 
c onfused the jury. In 1663, a jury asked upon what sta t ute 
this charge was founded, and the j udge answered t hat it was 
common law. In 1803, the New York Evening Post echoed t he 
question-- " By the way, we would like to know under what 
statute this prosecution is commenced?" The bewi l derment 
stemmed from the fact that juri es decided i ntent i n cr imina l 
common law; but they were not to so decide under thi s 
particular criminal charge. In defamation act ions, t rut h 
was a justification, but was not permitted in this 
particular defamation. Defamation had originate d as a 
breach of the peace by making a false statement; when t ruth 
could not be used as a defense, juries were left without the 
crime as they understood it. By divorcing defamation 
jurisprudence from the charge of seditious libe l , Eng l ish 
jurists left their juries with nothing but a politica l 
charge (sedition) for political purposes (suppression o f 
dissent) . Therefore, James Morton Smith could trul y make 
the statement that "all sedition cases were political tria l s 
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f r om start to finish ." Yet the phenomenon noted by Levy 
persisted; attac ks on the law were aimed at the limita t ion 
of the jury and the denial of truth as a defense. This 
leaves us with the conclusion that the failure to attack the 
concept of seditious libel lay in t he societal consensus 
that subscribed to it--there should be limits on the liberty 
of the press; the government can be criminally assaulted 
with mere words. We need not agree with these strictures to 
recognize that they existed.' 
The di f ficulty for early American society in 
implementing this consensus lay in the early development of 
the law of seditious libel, which excluded truth as a 
defense. A law was necessary that could reconci l e seditious 
libel with the familiar principles of defamation. The 
Sedition Act of 1798 offered the necessary elements to 
provide the balance bet ween liberty of the press and 
l icentiousness. The jury was to decide intent as well as 
the fact of publication; the Act also permitted truth a s a 
defense. The political motivation inherent in sedit i ous 
libel quickly asserted itself in the administration of the 
Sedition Act. Federalist judges distorted the law to an 
extreme; instead of a safeguard to the press, it was used as 
a cudgel in the hands of Federalist judges determined to 
employ it in the suppression of Republican dissent. The 
Sedition Act was a prime example of an advancement in law 
destroyed by bad intent and bad enforcement. 
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When Jefferson announced that "er ror of opinion may be 
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it, " 
Repub lican guardianship of the press s e emed ass ured . 
However, Jefferson was merely moving prosecution of 
seditious libel to the state courts where he believed they 
belonged. He wrote the governors of Pennsyl vani a and 
Connecticut, encouraging them to initiate prosecut i ons f o r 
seditious libel that maligned him. Levy remarks that it 
would not be surprising to find a simi l ar letter to George 
Clinton of New York urging the instigation of prosecut ions 
for seditious libel in New York. The home of Hami l ton ' s Ne w 
York Evening Post was an obvious venue, and Levy is 
reasonable to expect such a discover y. 8 
That there was in fact a prosecution for seditious 
libel in New York had litt l e, i f anyth i n g , to do with Thomas 
Jefferson. The man indicted for seditious libel, Harry 
Croswell, was a junior editor of an upstate paper. The 
paper that attracted the a t tention of the Attorney Gene r al 
was Croswell's personal project, a pub l ication barely 
dignified by the term tabloid. The items indicted were not 
original. Harry Croswell was actual l y arres t ed for 
affronting Ambrose Spencer. Spencer decided to use his 
considerable political power to squash the Wasp, and instead 
stirred up a hornet's nest. 
That Spencer was using the char ge of sed i tious libe l in 
time-honored fashion to suppress Harry Croswell ' s deplorab l e 
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paper seems obvious from his approach to the court 
proceedings. He fought furiously to keep the case in an 
infer i or court where he reputedly hand-picked judges and 
jury. He flatly refused to admit evidence of truth as a 
defense, and most curiously, he pursued the weaker of the 
two libels against the president. The issue of the Wasp 
which contained that libel was particularly offensive to 
Ambrose Spencer. Most telling of all, he demanded a 
performance bond to prevent further publishing by Harry 
Croswell until trial, a demand the court denied. 
Spencer's major miscalculation was in assuming that 
Croswell was defenseless. He could not have known that the 
author of one of the indicted items was a young law student 
clerking for his brother-in-law, the formidable Elisha 
Williams, and would bring not only Williams, ' but his two 
closest friends and political associates into the case. 
Spencer did not anticipate the defense team's talent for 
delay, which gave them time to enlist statewide Federalist 
support. Luck was with him in the timing of the trial; the 
Louisiana Purchase kept publicity to a minimum. Spencer 's 
luck ran out in the appeal. 
Upstate Federalists apparently had intended to engage 
Alexander Hamilton at an early stage, which may explain the 
defense's penchant for delay. They had to proceed without 
him for the trial. When Hamilton was finally free to take 
the case to appeal, the defense had already offered the 
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obvious arguments against seditious libel tenets and in 
favor of the innovations contained in the expired Sedition 
Act. Hamilton went beyond this line o f reasoning and 
offered the definition of liberty of the press that 
subseqently was to prove satisfactory to twenty-three 
states. Hamilton, by redefining the law, t r anscended the 
political aspects of the trial and created an enduring and 
acceptable test--intent of the libel's author, rather than 
previous "bad tendency" test which measured the effect on 
the audience. The federal government has not initiated a 
seditious libel prosecution since expiration of the Sedition 
Act. According to Michael Gibson, assistant professor of 
law at Oklahoma City University, only eleven defamation 
cases reached the Supreme Cour t by 191 7 . What Gi bson 
describes as "the last gasp of sedit i ous libel" occurred 
when Theodore Roosevelt attempted to prosecute t he New Yo rk 
World and the Indianapolis News for allegations that fri e nds 
of the president had profited from the Panama Canal 
purchase. Federal officials in Indianapolis refused to co-
operate, and Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the World, urged 
pursuit of the case to the Supreme Court, des pite lower 
federal courts dismissing the charges for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed that seditious 
libel cases had no standing in federal courts. The outcry 
against Roosevelt's action appeared, not only in the press, 
but significantly, in professional legal journals as well. 
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New York had not conducted a seditious libel case since 
Croswell. As the federal courts, the bar and the press 
joined in accord, it would indicate that by 1911, the 
consensus for seditious libel had evaporated. 9 
Yet wartime measures in both World War I (the Espionage 
and Sedi t ion Acts) and World War II (the Smith Act), 
designed to repress, instead evoked opposition, discussion, 
and redefinition of free speech and a free press. A new 
consensus, born of the McCarthy era, emerged. The decision 
of the Supreme Court in 1964 in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan that "a public official could not recover damages 
for a libel relating to his offical conduct unless he first 
proved actual malice" generally appears to be the 
replacement for Hamil ton's doctrine. 1 0 
If Hamilton's definitions are no longer applicable to 
modern freedom of the press, there remains one fur t her 
aspect to the Croswell case that merits notice. The 
Croswell case remains a virtual snapshot of the law in a 
moment of transformation. To be perceived as just, law must 
be predictable; that is, stable and consistent. Yet law 
rigidly construed according to precedents no longer 
applicable to existing circumstances can be unjust. Law 
must also be responsive to the needs of the society changing 
around it. To find the balance between flexibility and 
predictability is an ongoing quest for jurists. 
Attorneys from both sides of the jurisprudential fence 
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tried the Cr oswell case. Spencer a ttempt ed to preserve the 
old concepts of seditious libel to qu a sh a po l it i ca l 
opponent. Hami l ton's argument made clea r t hat t h e o l d 
construct of the common law had, i n life , if not in court , 
been replaced by the principles incorporated in the much-
maligned Sedition Act. Hamilton provi ded a bal ance between 
liberty and limits for the press that was accep tab le to his 
society. 
People v. Croswell can also be a cautionary ta l e for 
those who work in the law, making or en fo rcing it. A good 
l aw can be undermined by bad enforcement , as in the Sedition 
Ac~; bad law can be rejected by non-compliance--a very 
dangerous precedent indeed. Law needs to be judge d in the 
courts, and not in the streets, to obtain t he ul timate 
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